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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
congressional mandate necessary. The FCC's previous controls over
CATV have proven unsatisfactory."0 The FCC, since 1966 when it
assumed jurisdiction over CATV systems has requested clarifying guide-
lines from Congress, but Congress has refused."' Moreover, Congress
deleted the provision relating to CATV in its present revision of the
1909 Copyright Act.52 The FCC, with or without congressional guide-
lines, is the logical governmental agency to resolve most adequately and
amicably the competing private, public, and economic interests involved
in CATV transmission of copyrighted works. In light of the inaction of
Congress and the Southwestern Cable decision, the FCC should adopt its
own policies to protect the small local stations, the copyright holder, and
CATV, thereby accommodating the growth of CATV and of new stations
in local areas.
ERIC MILLS HOLm.ES
Federal Jurisdiction-Expansion of the Civil Rights Act of 1871
The Civil Rights Act of 1871' creates a federal cause of action for
persons who are deprived of constitutionally guaranteed rights by anyone
acting under color of state law. Notwithstanding the broad language,2
courts have generally restricted the use of this statute to members of
minority groups who encounter difficulty in receiving a fair hearing in
state courts.3 As a result, the unlawful actions that most often have been
"0 For excellent discussions of this aspect of the CATV dilemma see Note, The,
Wire Mire: The FCC and CATV, 79 HARv. L. REV. 366 (1965); Note, On a Clear
Day 1505. The authority of the FCC to act is unclear, and requests for clarifying
guidelines from Congress have, to date, received no final action. RUCKER 178.
1 It has been most difficult to get Congress to act because of the pressure from
broadcasters and CATV lobbies. Note, CATV Not Copyright Infringnent, 863
n.45. One writer stated that the "reason for all the delays ... was because nearly
a third of the Senate had at least remote financial interests in CATV." Comment,
The Final Decision 406.
" For a summary of the present state of the copyright revision bill, see 392 U.S.
at 396 n.17.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964).
-Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to
the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Con-
stitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law,
suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
Id.
'See, e.g., Lee v. Washington, 390 U.S. 333 (1968) (Negroes); CORE v.
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dealt with include racial segregation in public accommodations and
facilities4 and in educational facilities,5 unequal employment opportuni-
ties,' and similar acts of discrimination.
The judicial limitations on the use of the statute apparently are based
on its history and the supposed intent of Congress. The main purpose of
the Civil Rights Act was to aid Negroes in their struggle to gain full
constitutional rights as guaranteed them by the fourteenth amendment.
Conditions that existed in the United States at the time of passage,8 the
title of the bill,' and the legislative history" all indicate a purpose to help
Negroes gain their full rights. In the United States Supreme Court case
of Haig v. CIO, Justice Stone indicated that the statute should be used
to enforce civil rights only. Pointing out that a jurisdictional amount is
required for general federal question jurisdiction, 12 whereas no minimum
amount in controversy is required for jurisdiction under section 1983, he
reasoned that litigants should not be allowed to evade the jurisdictional
amount requirement by invoking section 1983 when their claim was
capable of monetary evaluation. The Supreme Court, in the later cases of
McNeese v. Board of Education3 and Monroe v. Pape,4 concluded that
Norwalk Redev. Agency, 395 F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1968) (Negroes and Puerto
Ricans); Wright v. McMann, 387 F.2d 519 (2d Cir. 1967) (state prisoners);
contra, e.g., Jordan v. Kelly, 223 F. Supp. 731 (W.D. Mo. 1963).
O'See, e.g., Fleming v. South Carolina Elec. & Gas Co., 239 F.2d 277 (4th Cir.
1956) (segregated bus seating); Brooks v. Tallahassee, 202 F. Supp. 56 (N.D.
Fla. 1961) (separate waiting rooms and lunch counters at municipal airport);
Williams v. Kansas City, 104 F. Supp. 848 (W.D. Mo. 1952), aff'd, 205 F.2d 47
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 826 (1953) (denial of admission to municipal
swimming pool).
See, e.g., Hill v. Board of Educ., 390 F.2d 583 (6th Cir. 1968) (Negro teacher's
right to employment when school integrated); School Bd. v. Kilby, 259 F.2d 497
(4th Cir. 1958) (school open for white students only); Holmes v. Danner, 191 F.
Supp. 394 (M.D. Ga. 1961) (admission to public college).
'See, e.g., Birnbaum v. Trussell, 371 F.2d 672 (2d Cir. 1966) (Negro physi-
cian); Jordan v. Hutcheson, 323 F.2d 597 (4th Cir. 1963) (Negro attorneys).
'Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 171 (1961) ; Ethridge v. Rhodes, 268 F. Supp.
83, 88 (S.D. Ohio 1967); United States ex rel. Wakeley v. Pennsylvania, 247 F.
Supp. 7, 10 (E.D. Pa. 1965); Francis v. Lyman, 108 F. Supp. 884, 838 (D. Mass.
1952), aff'd, 203 F.2d 809 (1st Cir. 1953).
'See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 173-74 (1961).
' "An Act to enforce the Provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Con-
stitution of the United States, and for other Purposes." 17 Stat. 13 (1871). The
popular name was the Ku Klux Act of April 20, 1871.
10 See generally Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 171-87 (1961).
11307 U.S. 496 (1939).
"28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1964).
1373 U.S. 668 (1963).
"365 U.S. 167 (1961).
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the statute was passed to provide a remedy where none was available. 1
Implicit in these decisions is the Court's recognition of Congressional
intent to help minority groups, since members of the dominant group usu-
ally receive a fair hearing in state courts.1
Two recent cases, however, held that federal courts had jurisdiction
under this statute even though the historic minority group test was not
met. In Joseph v. Rowlen,'1 plaintiff was selling cooking utensils on the
street when he was arrested by defendant-policeman. Plaintiff alleged
that the arrest was made upon the basis of second-hand, unsupported
reports that he was annoying pedestrians and was, therefore, without
probable cause and in violation of the due process clause. The federal
district court directed a verdict for defendant, holding that the deprivation
of rights complained of must be part of a systematic policy of discrimina-
tion against a class or group of persons to support a claim under section
1983.8 The court of appeals, however, ruled that the cases relied on by
the district court were no longer valid'0 and remanded the case for trial.
In Meredith v. Allen County War Memorial Hospital Commission,20
plaintiff, a physician on the staff of the county hospital, was refused re-
appointment to the staff following a hearing by the commission, which,
plaintiff alleged, did not comport with the requirements of due process.
The district court dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, ap-
parently upon reasoning similar to that used by the district court in
Joseph.2 But the court of appeals, neglecting the question of plaintiff's
status to sue, addressed itself to questions dealing with whether the
defendants could be held liable under the statute and whether a guaranteed
right of plaintiff's had been denied him. All literal elements of the statute
being met, the district court was held to have jurisdiction, and the case
was remanded for trial.22
The jurisdictional facts in these two cases are dissimilar to cases in
which the courts historically have recognized jurisdiction under section
1983. In one case a policeman apparently made an error in judgment
'r 373 U.S. at 671-72; 365 U.S. at 480. For an example of a lower court's view,
see Romero v. Weakley, 226 F.2d 399 (9th Cir. 1955).
Contra, e.g., Jordan v. Kelly, 223 F. Supp. 731 (W.D. Mo. 1963).17402 F.2d 367 (7th Cir. 1968). The district court's opinion was not published.
' 402 F.2d at 368-69. The cases relied on were Truitt v. Illinois, 278 F.2d 819
(7th Cir. 1960) ; Stift v. Lynch, 267 F.2d 237 (7th Cir. 1959).
402 F.2d at 369.
"397 F.2d 33 (6th Cir. 1968). The district court's opinion was not published.
"See id. at 36 (dissenting opinion of Phillips, J.).
"397 F.2d at 34-36.
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by arresting a salesman without probable cause; in the other, a hospital
board failed to allow a doctor to answer charges of misconduct before dis-
missing him. There was neither claim nor evidence of minority group
discrimination. On the contrary, it was implicit in the results reached by
the trial courts that none was involved.
The court of appeals in Joseph indicated a belief that the minority
group test had not survived the Supreme Court decision in Monroe v.
Pape.23 In Monroe, the same court of appeals had upheld a finding of
no jurisdiction when Monroe accused Pape, a police officer, of illegal
entry and search of his home.24 The Supreme Court, however, reversed, 25
holding that an entry exceeding a policeman's authority was under color
of state law. It further held that there is no requirement for jurisdiction
under section 1983 that plaintiff's rights be abridged as a result of "a
specific intent to deprive a person of a federal right,"2 6 but that the statute
should be used to "afford a federal right in federal court because, by
reason of prejudice, passion, neglect, intolerance or otherwise, state laws
might not be enforced ....
Although the Supreme Court did not mention the minority group
test,28 the court of appeals indicated that the language that eliminated the
specific intent test also required discontinuing the minority group test.
Monroe, however, was a member of a minority group ;29 thus, even if the
Court had indicated that the minority group test was not a requirement
for jurisdiction under section 1983, it would have been dictum. Since the
Supreme Court's lengthy and thorough opinion explicitly eliminated
only the requirement of a specific intent to deprive federal rights, the
decision in Monroe did not necessarily require the abandonment of the
minority group test in determining jurisdiction under section 1983.30
In Meredith, the court of appeals concerned itself with the problems of
"under color of" state law, the requirements of due process, and the de-
fenses and immunities raised by defendants." It apparently read the
language of the statute strictly as written and neglected to consider the
2 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
2 Monroe v. Pape, 272 F.2d 365 (7th Cir. 1959).
25365 U.S. 167 (1961).
20 Id. at 187.
2
, Id. at 180.28 402 F.2d at 369.
29 365 U.S. at 203.
o But cf. Cohen v. Norris, 300 F.2d 24, 29 (9th Cir. 1962), expressly overruling
a similar doctrine, after Monroe was decided by the Supreme Court.
1397 F.2d at 35-36.
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limitation generally imposed by judicial interpretation. Although apparent
Congressional intent should not be absolutely binding in the interpretation
of enactments, such a clearly expressed and judicially accepted intent3 2
should not be be ignored without explanation. 3
Various courts, including the one that decided Joseph, have denounced
the desirability or intention of transforming every case in which a plaintiff
can urge state discrimination into a federal action.3" That result seems
inevitable, however, if the decisions in Joseph and Meredith are followed.
It may not be desirable to allow this new source of cases into federal
courts in situations where the state court is both available and effective,
and is in fact often the court best suited to decide the case." Increasingly
evident today is a desire to restrict federal jurisdiction. Many federal
courts more readily abstain from hearing questions that could be decided
on state law," and there are proposals to limit federal jurisdiction by
statute.3" To needlessly expand the jurisdiction-and consequently the
workloads--of the federal courts through an expanded interpretation of
section 1983 seems undesirable.
CHARLES M. BROWN, JR.
Federal Jurisdiction-Manufactured Diversity Disassembled
In the recent case of McSparren v. Weist,' the Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit, reversing its own prior decisions, held that the appoint-
ment of an out-of-state guardian of a minor for the purpose of creating
diversity was an assignment improperly invoking jurisdiction under
" Cases cited notes 7-15 supra.
" See Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM.
L. REV. 527 (1947).
",402 F.2d at 369 & n.6.
" See generally ALL, STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE
AND FEDERAL COURTS (1965); Marden, Reshaping Diversity Jurisdiction, 54
A.B.A.J. 453, 455 (1968).
" Although the recent cases of Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965), and
Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964), have expanded the use of pendent juris-
diction by restricting the doctrine of abstention, the lower federal courts still
abstain in many cases. See, e.g., Zwickler v. Koota, 261 F. Supp. 985 (1966),
rev'd, 389 U.S. 241 (1967). It is a widely held belief that "state courts should be
the primary source of interpretation and application of state law." Marden, Re-
shaping Diversity Jurisdiction, 54 A.B.A.J, 453, 455 (1968).
"See ALl, 'STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEN STATE AND
FEDERAL COURTS (1965).
'402 F.2d 867 (3d Cir. 1968).
"926 [Vol. 47
